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Industries with private and public enterprises
w)
by Pieter H.M. Ruys
Tilburg University
5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands
1. Introduction
In this paper attention will be focussed on an industry with public enter-
prises and institutions, rather than on a public enterprise i tself. Public
enterprises can be used by the government as an instrument to implement an
industrial policy. Since there exist a variety of instruments and objec-
tives, we firstly categorize industries as well as market structures (sec-
tion 2). Next, we mention some recent results ( section 3). In the last
section a general equilibrium model i s introduced that offers a frsmework
to policy makers when designing an efficient organization of an industry
with external effects.
2. Regulation and orRanization of an industrv
The performance criteria for individual (private or public) enterprises
are derived in our approach from the government policy regarding the in-
dustry to which the enterprises belong. An industry is a set of enter-
prises supplyíng closely related markets, and of rules and institutions
serving or coordinating these enterprises. All markets are considered in
which commodities are traded that are close substitutes or complements.
Industries are therefore serving multiproduct markets, such as transporta-
tion, health or agriculture. Some products may be weakly marketable, i.e.,
their average operating cost is not covered by the consumers' price, e.g.
urban transport. Other products may be strongly marketable, e.g. private
cars. The output of an industry, however, is always assumed to consists of
marketable, private goods, possibly with external effects in production or
consumption.
-------------------------------------------------------
') Comments by Dieter BtSss, Rob Gilles, Gerard van der Laan and Dolf
Talman are gratefully acknowledged. This research project is part of the
VF program Equilibrium and Disequilibrium.
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An industry is called regulated if the government wants to determine the
supply and the consumers' prices on the important markets of the industry.
An industry is called organized if there is an institution, possibly non-
governmental, that is concerned with the optimal performance of the mar-
kets in the industry, and that also has the power to impose the necessary
measures and conditions. This organization may actively be supported by
the government, such as anti-cartel legislation. If there is no inter-
ference with markets or market performance in an industry, we call it a
free industry.
There may be a great variety in institutional behavior and legal founda-
tion of the enterprises within an industry. We will categorize them accor-
díng to the degree of (economic) freedom an enterprise has in determining
íts own existential role in the industry: can it determine its own marke-
ting decisions and goals? Since privately owned enterprises may be fully
or partly regulated, and government owned enterprises may be profit maxi-
mizes, ownership is not a sufficient índication for behavior. Enterprises
are called private if their marketing decisions and goals are free, and
ublic if these are enforced by the government. Enterprises are called
specialized if their marketing decisions and goals depend on statutory
contracts, which can either be entered freely (private firms) or be enfor-
ced by a public body (public firms). For example, an sutonomously profit-
maximizing private clinic, or an autonomous non-prof.tt hospital are both
private enterprises. If they are, however, statutorily embedded in a na-
tionalized health system, they are specialized enterprises.
The set of buyers and sellers, each characterized by their institutional
behavior, market size, and number, is called the market structure of an
industry. It is affected by the technology and the strategy of the enter-
prises, by external effects, and by the government policy. The supply side
of the market structure ranges from only private firms, to only public
firms. An intermedíate market structure may refer to a mixed structure of
private and public firms or to a privatized structure of partly privately
owned enterprises. This categorization is summarized in diagram 1.
According on the external effects or the monopoly profits are considered
to be more important, the industry moves usually from the left to the
3
right in the diagram (regulation), or from above to below (nationaliza-
tion).
Both the public sector and the regulation of the industry have been grown
impressively in all European countries during the last decades. Still,
there does not exist too much economic theory about public decision
Diagram 1: Industry structure and market structure






Mixed or see section 3 transportation;
Privatized steel
Public firms - cooperative public utilities;
public utilities socialist countries
making and even the existing theory (Boiteux, Hotelling a.o.) has been
applied to a very limited extent. To this conclusion arrive Deleau (1987)
for France and Kay, Mayer and Thompson (1986) for the United Kingdom. It
is being realized at this moment how extremely difficult it is to formula-
te and to implement the objective of "social welfare" which the public
manager ought to maximize. But an unambiguous and controlable formulation
could be even more dangerous for public enterprises, because it is the
government who ultimately specifies it, and the (short term} interests of
a government may very easíly conflict with the (long term) interests of an
industry.
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The alleged inefficiency of public enterprises and regulated industries is
now being cured with measures such as privatization and deregulation. It
should be stressed that such measures only work if no serious market
failures occur in the industry. Even if all enterprises in the industry
produce efficiently, the industry as a whole may perform inefficiently or
unsatisfactorily. Efficient bus companies, e.g., may not prevent conges-
tion in urban areas. It seems worthwile to look after other methods than
privatization or deregulation in order to improve the efficiency of an
industry.
3. Some industrial policy measures
The first objective of an industrial policy mentioned here is to reduce
the social cost of monopoly power. If one wants to leave the industry
free, one might (partially) nationalize the monopoly and distribute the
profits (see BSs, 1987). Or, if one wants the enterprises private, one
might regulate the industry. A recently adopted measure is the "RPI minus
X" formula, proposed by Littlechild (1983). This means that the rise of
the tariff index of a basket of outputs of a public enterprise should not
be larger than the UK retail price index minus Xx. Measures that improve
the performance of markets and organize an industry are: breaking up the
monopoly, and using public firms as policy instruments. This approach has
been proposed a.o. by Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1987). They show that
the introduction of a public firm, with the task to maximize total surplus
under a budget constraint, results in a socially superior allocation. A
similar approach has been adopted by Harris and Wiens (1980), Beato and
Mas Colell (~984), and De Fraja and Delbono (1986). The last paper reports
that at Nash equilibria, social welfare may be higher when the public firm
is instructed to maximize profits rather than total surplus.
A second objective of industrial policy might be to reduce the inefficien-
cy of public firms. BSs (1987) proposes again (partial) privatization of
the public enterprise. This influences its objectives, causing a trade off
between efficiency and effectivity regarding governmental goals. However,
as has been remarked by Yarrow (1986), it is competition that is the best
remedy for the problems mentioned.
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If the government wants to improve competition despite the presence of
external effects in the industry, it is necessary to assign all relevant
social cost and benefits to the agents, such that their opportunity sets
are influenced. For more competition corresponds with more decentraliza-
tion, one needs to organize the industry such that specialized markets can
perform satisfactoraly. One suggestion, made by Starkie (1984), is to
separate in public transport the track and signalling systems of railways
(the infrastructure) from the operation of train services. Similar sugges-
tions come from Vickers and Yarrow (1985), who argue that it is feasible
to restructure British Telecom along such lines to promote competition.
These suggestions fit perfectly with and can be based upon a general equi-
librium model designed by Ruys (1984) and Ruys and van der Laan (198~). In
that model the symbiosis of the public infrastructure and the private
operations is made explicit. An outline is given in the next section.
4. The organization of an industrv with external effects
A new concept of goods will be used in the general equilibrium model. It
is based on the observation that some private commodities are closely
related to public goods, e.g. cars and roads. Such a pair of commodities
is called a compound good, if there exists for each agent a feasibility
constraint relating a quantity of the private part (called semi private
good) with a minimal quantity of the public part (called semi public good)
required by that agent. This relation could be represented implicitly in
the utility or production function, but will be specified here explicitly
and separately. Compound goods are very informative. The demand for the
semi private good will be used here as an indicator for the need of the
semi public good.
We assume that the semi private goods are produced and supplied by (spe-
cialized) private firms on a competitive market. The semi public goods are
provided by (specialized) public institutions, but may be produced by the
private sector. We assume that such a semi public good is completely fi-
nanced by a mark-up on the producer's price of the related semi private
6
good. This means that the compound good can be provided by the industry
without subsidy from the government.
Since consumers have different feasibility constraints, their shadow pri-
ces are also different. A shadow price is zero, of course, if the con-
straint is not binding for the consumer. Let py be the price of semi pri-
vate good y for consumer i, then
P1 - P t t t Tl
Y Y Yz Yz~
where pY is the producer's price, tyz the producer's shadow price of his
feasibility constraint in producing y, with respect to the semi public
good z, and Tyz i-th consumer's shadow price. Since these shadow prices or
tariffs are virtual prices or taxes, we know from disequilibrium theory
that an efficient (and feasible) allocation is obtained if all agents are
confronted with these prices.
The individual tariffs in our model are not determined by the government,
but by the (specialized) private firms supplying directly the semi private
goods to the market and maximizing profits. They know the customer's beha-
vior much better than a distant government, and compare for example re-
sponsive pricing in elasticity or in transport. Since both the firm and
the customer have interest in the provision of the semi public good, and
on the other hand competition between firms is mitigating excessive ta-
riffs, it is not unreasonable to expect that diversified tariffs cen be
set which approximate the individual shadow prices. The revenue of these
tariffs is handed over to the (specialized) public institution. This in-
stitution has the task to determine the size of the semi public good such
that its social cost equals its social benefits. Generally, this boils
down to equalize the revenue from the semi-private goods and the produc-
tion costs of the semi public good. Precise conditions can be found in the
papers mentioned above. There it has also been shown that an equilibrium
in this economy is Pareto optimal. One may notice that the tax burden is
relieved to the amount collected through tariffs.
As an example, we propose some implications of this model for the organi-
zatíon of the transportation industry. This industry is charactarized by
multiple modes of transportation (car, taxi, bicycle, bus, train), and
various types of enterprises (private or public, professional or household
activity). In diagram 2, the organization of such an industry has been
depicted. It is assumed in this diagram that the roadsystem and the infra-
structure are not considered by the consumers as (pure) public goods,
entering their utility functions. If that were the case, there would be a
direct demand from travellers (voters) for the provision of those public
goods, as expressed by their Lindahl prices.
Some final remarks will be made on the performance of such a mechanism and
on problems related with the eventual implementation.
It has been remarked already that in case of external effects which differ
in valuation between agents (producers and~or consumers), our mechanism
allows for an efficient allocation in the industry and for competition in
production. This is made possible by a separation of public and private
decisions, together with a correct assignment of social cost and social
benefits to the (decentralized) decision units. These decision units have
obtained a convexified technology, and have only to decide about (semi)
private goods.
For a good performance of our mechanism it is, firstly, required that
there is a real need for coordination between, e.g., the various modes of
transport wíthin the industry. For, if the social costs and benefits of
these various modes are more or less equal for both producers and consu-
mers, there is no need to inform the decision units.
Secondly, the production units should be relatively small or such that the
body deciding about semi-private production can relatively easily be re-
placed. That is required for competition among producers.
Thirdly, no other discrimination of consumers and producers ís allowed
then on economic grounds. This may contradict, for example, the nationali-
ty principle adapted at the moment in European transport policy. This
nationality principle says that each country should tax only its own citi-
zens for the national transport infrastructure, such that no European
citizen is taxed twice. If the cost of that infrastructure is more or less
8
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equal, then this principle protects the traveller against abuse made by
local governments of tolls, and contributes considerably to global wel-
fare. But if the costs of infrastructure vary significantly, the nationa-
lity principle does not discriminate citizens economically where the opti-
mality conditions require such discrimination. A similar problem arises,
of course, within nations, if one compares travelling in cities with tra-
velling in the country. But, given the increasing problems caused by
transportation on the environment, and given the serious intention to
improve competition on a European scale, a reassessment of established
policies seems inevitable.
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